This chapter explores the impact neoliberal urbanism has had on the conflicts and contestations that have erupted across European cities over the last decade. After presenting the concept of neoliberalization and its uneven implementation within Europe, it delineates the characteristic features of neoliberal urbanism, highlighting in particular the strategies with which cities respond to global pressures and crisis developments. City managers have intensified and innovated regeneration and upgrading policies, deliberately valorizing real estate and public space, and politicians have turned, especially since the 2008 financial crisis, to more austere policies and new strategies to displace undesired uses and groups from vibrant parts of the city. As tensions and conflicts have emerged around all of these strategies, different forms of urban resistance have
emerged, which themselves have been shaped by the very restructuring processes and policies that the contestations—to varying degrees and in more and less articulate forms—oppose. The third section of the chapter deepens some observations about the contestations around neoliberal urbanism: first, how the field of urban activism has become both larger and more heterogeneous in response to the particularities of urban neoliberalization; second, how struggles against urban upgrading have taken on a variety of forms, covering the spectrum from Right to the City networks and their well-organized campaigns all the way to violent uprisings; and, finally, how the massive societal upheaval that erupted in Greece and Spain provided a context for new grassroots solidarity initiatives to build ‘another city’. The concluding section resituates these findings, particularly the challenge thrown up by the heterogeneity of the contemporary forms of urban resistance, within the conceptual framework of neoliberalization and its being overcome by ‘deep societalization.’

Conceptualizing Neoliberalization

As we showed in our introduction, there are strong reasons for highlighting the role of structural factors for analysing the wave of uprisings that has swept through European cities. The structural factors at work here are neoliberalization processes that have deeply transformed what used to be ‘Fordist’ or ‘Keynesian cities’, and have thereby also transformed the conditions for urban resistance movements. Particularly, the latest round of the neoliberalization of the urban, which has intensified austerity to new levels, lies behind the recent contestations and uprisings. Therefore, understanding the dynamic of neoliberal urbanism and its latest incarnation, austerity urbanism, will help to shed light on different types of urban resistance and the increasingly fuzzy boundaries between them.

In our conceptualization of neoliberalism, we are building on a long debate involving political-economic accounts and Foucauldian perspectives, which together go a long way towards explaining how the neoliberal project is continually reworked and contested in various spheres of life (cf. Mayer & Künkel, 2012). We draw in particular on authors such as David Harvey, as well as Peck, Brenner and Theodore, who have
highlighted the instability and evolving nature of the neoliberal regime of accumulation (Harvey, 2006, pp. 28–29) and the relational interconnections between neoliberalizing spaces—from neighbourhoods, cities and regions all the way to nation states and multinational zones—within a transnational governance system (Brenner, Peck, & Theodore, 2010; Peck, Theodore, & Brenner, 2012). Such a conceptualization is helpful for bringing the neoliberalization of the urban into view.\(^1\) Harvey, who views neoliberalism as a class project, emphasizes that it entails, in addition to accumulation through the expansion of wage labour in industry, accumulation by dispossession, i.e., the predatory appropriation of surplus, via commodification and privatization of land, the conversion of collective and common forms of property rights into exclusive private-property rights, including the erosion of property rights that have been won through class struggle, such as state pensions, welfare, education and health care, through financialization, expanded use of the credit system and speculative raiding, as well as the extraction of rents from patents and intellectual property rights.

While Harvey’s perspective focuses on the neoliberal system as a whole, the perspective suggested by Peck, Brenner and Theodore focuses more directly on the political dimension of ‘regulatory restructuring’ with respect to the increasing marketization and commodification of all realms of social life.\(^2\) Their concept of neoliberalization emphasizes its process character, the path-dependency of concrete neoliberal projects, the role of strategies and that of the state. Therefore, they prefer to speak of neoliberalization instead of neoliberalism, signalling that we are not dealing with a fixed state or condition, but rather with a process of market-oriented regulatory restructuring. This process does not entail a ‘convergence’ of regulatory outcomes. Rather, neoliberalization projects assume contextually specific forms as they collide

\(^1\) Competing conceptualizations, such as, e.g., those presented by Joseph Stiglitz, who equates neoliberalization with a world-wide homogenization of regulatory systems, or by Elmar Altvater (2009) and Brand and Sekler (2009), who see neoliberalism as having come to an end in August 2008, are less helpful in this regard.

\(^2\) They conceive neoliberalization as one among several tendencies of regulatory change that have been unleashed across the global capitalist system since the 1970s, and describe its three major features as follows: (1) It prioritizes market-based, market-oriented or market-disciplinary responses to regulatory problems; (2) it strives to intensify commodification in all realms of social life; and (3) it often mobilizes financial instruments to open up new arenas for capitalist profit-making.
with diverse regulatory landscapes inherited from earlier rounds of regulatory formation, such as Fordism or national developmentalism or state socialism. They view neoliberalization as a contradictory process of state-authorized market transformation (Peck & Theodore, 2012, p. 178), and as pushing endlessly for marketization and privatization, and, knowing no limits, never able to produce an equilibrium (Peck et al., 2012, p. 277). Because of its focus on the state, this neo-Marxist perspective is productively complemented by Foucauldian approaches focusing on neoliberal governmentalities, which highlight the ways in which state and corporate actors create and promote particular subjectivities (cf. Mayer & Künkel, 2012). Governmentality approaches, by focusing on state intervention in subject formation, can sharpen our understanding of neoliberal urbanism and the evolving relations between different kinds of uprisings and political institutions and discourses on all scales.

Rather than seeing a rolling-back of state power, both of these conceptualizations of the neoliberal project or regime—the neo-Marxist/regulationist and the Foucauldian—highlight the active mobilization of state institutions to extend commodification and promote market rule, as well as the (self-)technologies of identification and responsibilization through which state programs and discourses work. Further, these perspectives imply that there is no single ‘pure’ form or ‘ism’, because any neoliberal formation hinges upon contextually specific strategies of regulatory reorganization. Therefore Brenner et al. (2010) have spoken of ‘variegated neoliberalism’ to suggest that the systemically uneven character of neoliberal hegemony is best understood by analysing the ways in which a political project is embedded in different contexts, which political and power structures facilitate the spread of market rule to more and more arenas of social life, and which concessions to local culture and/or protest movements have been shaping the neoliberal project in various ‘local third ways’ (see Mayer & Künkel, 2012, pp. 10–11).

In this perspective, cities and urban regions are seen as key arenas in and through which processes of regulatory creative destruction occur (Brenner & Theodore, 2002): They are: sites of regulatory ‘problems’ (such as poverty, crime, joblessness, etc.); sites of putative regulatory ‘solutions’ (where new policy prototypes are developed and experimented with, which, if effective, will travel around the world); and sites of contra-
dictions, conflicts and opposition to such projects. While western states in the course of globalization have fostered competition among cities, they have handed more and more tasks pertaining to economic development as well as social infrastructure to municipalities. In spite of this pervasive trend, there is also no such thing as the neoliberal city, just as there is no pure ‘neoliberalism’. Instead, diverse place- and territory-specific patterns of neoliberalization have emerged as the search for urban policy models and forms of governance has intensified. Such contextually specific patterns have emerged wherever global, national, regional, and local alliances promote market-oriented solutions to regulatory problems: in housing, transportation, economic development, labour, the environment and so forth. The outcomes are not only contextually specific, as they depend on local institutional and political legacies and struggles, but are also always partial and impure forms and messy hybrids.

The different case studies in this volume are set in different countries, each representing its own ‘messy hybrid’ of neoliberalizing national and local politics, representing a broad spectrum, from authoritarian neoliberalism in Turkey, with its brutal clampdown on the Gezi Park protests, to the austere statism of Germany that so far has succeeded in preventing the spread of ‘crisis consciousness,’ not to mention mass movements involving broad sectors of society. Some case studies focus more, others less, on the specific ‘reengineering of the state according to a neoliberal blueprint of austerity’ (Slater in this volume). Across these contextually specific cases, one significant pattern stands out: There is a ‘two-speed’ Europe in terms of the implementation of neoliberal austerity strategies, a split between ‘core’ countries such as Britain, Germany and France, on the one hand, which have seen incremental neoliberalization starting as early as the 1970s, and countries on the European periphery, on the other, where austerity was imposed much later by the EU, IMF and the German government, in sudden and draconian ways, inflicting severe hardship on broad sectors of society.3

3 When Spain, Portugal and Greece joined the Eurozone, their industries lost competitiveness, the effects of which didn’t make themselves felt as long as real estate booms made up for the losses. This credit- and speculation-driven development led to vastly expanding corruption, which seriously impaired the respective governments’ capacity to act, and EU policies exacerbated these structural problems by supporting traditional elites.
Scandinavian governments were also comparatively late in jumping on the neoliberalization bandwagon, doing so on their own terms. For instance, Sweden became a ‘world champion in liberalization’, liberalizing faster than any country in the west (Clark, 2014). The resulting country-specific patterns of neoliberalization go some way in explaining differences in urban unrest across European cities, as will be shown in more detail in the second section of this chapter.

The German government began already after the fiscal crisis of 1974-75 to pass laws that aimed to consolidate the public debt, roll back public spending, and increase public revenue through tax cuts. This rollback neoliberalization, designed to stop the ‘inflation of entitlements of the working class’, was reinforced in the 1990s by the Maastricht Treaty, (a supranational national-political framework of financial politics, and the Stability and Growth Pact, which made sure that Eurozone member states would adhere to austerity measures after the introduction of the euro. The dismantling of the welfare state, which was achieved through the welfare/workfare reforms of the early 2000s, effectively lowered wages. The 2000 tax reform decreased Germany’s state revenues, and by 2010, the state had lost €50 billion annually as a result (Truger & Teichmann, 2010, p. 15). In 2009, the German government locked structurally balanced budgets into law on a national scale, a move that secured the ‘automation’ of restrictive fiscal-governance regimes and the authoritarian constitutionalization of austerity policies through law and the state (Petzold, 2015).

While German workers, as a result of this gradual normalization of austere statism, have experienced hardly any wage increases since 1999, workers in the rest of the Eurozone have been undercut by the wage freeze in Europe’s centre. Still, based on its strong export economy, and profiting from the euro vis-à-vis other EU countries, the German government has been able to garner broad support from its citizens and pass off its austerity politics as good governance (Belina, 2013). Thus, in spite of wage stagnation and large budgetary cutbacks, broad majorities, including marginalized groups, did not develop a sense of crisis (cf. Lill, 2015; Schmitt-Beck, 2013). Such conditions are not conducive to mass mobilization.
By contrast, the societies of Europe’s southern periphery that have been harshly affected by structural adjustment and austerity programs imposed by the EU crisis regime have seen very high rates of strikes, participation in demonstrations, public square protests and neighbourhood assemblies, coupled with all kinds of civil disobedience actions, from encircling parliaments and land squats to supermarket raids. Thus, we have a two-speed Europe with regard to the scope and intensity of protest. In most Northern European countries, where governments installed austerity measures in more incremental and less visible ways than was the case in Southern or Eastern Europe, without justifying their cuts to social and public infrastructures in terms of the crisis, neither crisis consciousness nor resistance became as widespread as in Southern Europe. What anti-austerity protests have flared up in Germany, France, Britain, the Scandinavian countries and Italy, they remained far from gaining majority support comparable to that received by the Indignados and Aganaktismenoi. And the mobilizations that did take place have rarely been able to reach the unorganized, unrepresented and impoverished working and middle classes, or the new poor, some of whom, instead, seem to flock to growing right-wing organizations and parties.\(^4\)

On the eastern periphery, the post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), where hyper versions of neoliberal urbanism have triumphed, for a variety of reasons protests have not been as massive as in Southern Europe, but diverse and novel grassroots mobilizations have taken place there as well (Jacobsson, 2015; Pleyers & Sava, 2015; Polanska in this volume). The effects of the legacy of state socialism, coupled with the ongoing processes of rapid neoliberalization, have led to a widespread mistrust of collective action and preferences for individualist problem-solving strategies.

\(^4\)Participants of the early anti-austerity demonstrations in Northern European countries, according to various surveys, came mainly from ‘the usual suspects’, such as unions, leftists, anti-globalization, ESF, anti-racist organizations, Occupy and Blockupy, and the Left Party (della Porta, 2015; Peterson, Wahlström, & Wennerhag, 2013).
Neoliberal Urbanism

After several rounds of neoliberalization, urban conditions and urban politics have transformed in fundamental ways. First, a roll-back of Fordist institutions and redistributive policies during the 1980s aimed to address the limits of the Keynesian city. In the succeeding roll-out phase during the 1990s, policy makers sought to ameliorate some of the destructive effects of the dismantling of the Fordist compromise. This was followed by a third round, in which, after the dot-com crash of 2001, urbanization became a global phenomenon, thanks to the integration of financial markets to debt-finance urban development around the world. Currently we are in a ‘post-crisis’ round of austerity urbanism, and the Keynesian city, along with its norms, its functional zoning and its particular form of urban renewal and suburbanization, have been replaced by a rather different formation (Mayer, 2012). Urban policy-making hinges no longer primarily on the institutions of the local elected state and its bureaucrats, but ever more on business, real estate and developer interests, all of which are increasingly global. The point of urban policy has become to facilitate the unfettered operation of ‘the market’. Urban services, what is left of them, have become increasingly privatized, and city governments purchasers rather than providers of services, the goal of which has become to activate and entrepreneurialize ‘clients’. The latest round of neoliberalization, in which the neoliberal project has been discredited but still not weakened by the 2008 crash and stagnant growth rates, as well as delegitimized by social movements, is characterized by a devolved form of extreme fiscal constraint, which in the northern countries is projected largely on to sub-national scales. In so-called Peripheral Europe, this manifests on national scales as well, thanks to EU and IMF politics. Everywhere municipalities are adversely affected, and many have developed an advanced form of austerity politics, which now not only dismantles Fordist social welfare infrastructures, as during the first roll-

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5 These phases, which roughly, but not everywhere, correspond to the decades indicated, are well described in Peck, Theodore, and Brenner (2009), and austerity urbanism in Peck (2012). The correspondences between these phases and the respective urban movements are presented in Mayer (2012, pp. 65–69) and Mayer (2013, pp. 6–10).

6 Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain.
back phase, but grinds away at what has survived repeated rounds of cut-
backs and neoliberal restructuring.

Neoliberal urbanism thus denotes a complex configuration involving
the local adaptation of neoliberal regulations, such as the enforcing of low
wages and insecure working conditions, restrictions of tenant’s as well as
worker’s rights debt as a disciplinary technique and specifically spatial
adaptations of neoliberal tenets, such as increasingly uneven spatial devel-
opment: While central areas are ever more spiffed up with expensive,
glitzy and securitized developments, poor neighbourhoods are suffering
even more cutbacks and surveillance. The politics of neoliberal urbanism
have been characterized by the deliberate valorization of real estate and
public space, creative city policies and punitive austerity policies. Both
the spatial-polarization and the social-precarization aspects of neoliberal
urbanism were only intensified through the measures by which policy
managers have sought to cope with the fall-out of the 2008 crisis. The
following list of these characteristic policies highlights how each of them
has contributed to the effect of exacerbating social imbalances and con-
icts, which in turn has transformed the urban polity, available resources
and the space available for urban residents. This also means that when, in
the wake of the financial crisis at the end of the 2000s, austerity policies
became more dominant across Europe, the material conditions for urban
resistance movements began to shift in the following ways:

1. The overarching political strategy continues to be what it has been
since the beginning of the neoliberal turn: the pursuit of growth first.
Festivalization, urban spectacles and signature events have always been
measures widely applied by urban managers seeking to accelerate
investment flows into the city and to improve their position in inter-
urban rivalry. Cities that come out on top in this global competition
include those whose real estate markets appear as safe havens to foot-
loose global capital, such as London, New York or Shanghai, or cities
whose credit-fuelled construction boom (e.g., Istanbul) or whose tour-
ism industry (e.g., Barcelona) have driven real estate surges. An effect
of the success in this interurban competition is exploding property
prices, which in turn have led to a surge in evictions, social displace-
ment and a new homeless crisis borne out of an affordable housing
crisis, rather than out of the subprime mortgage crisis, as was the case in Spain. In most other cities, shrinking budgets now prevent urban managers from implementing the type of big projects and urban spectacles they used to employ to radiate the message of success to investors and tourists alike. Cash-strapped cities—and not merely in the more heavily indebted European South—now turn to forms of locational politics that rely more on symbolic, low-cost ways to attract ‘creative classes’ to help in culturally upgrading their brand, i.e., innovative low-budget and especially culture-led efforts to mobilize city space for growth.

Such cultural branding strategies sometimes benefit, in ambiguous ways, alternative and sub-cultural movements, particularly those movements that can be fitted into creative city projects (cf. the chapters by Birke on Hamburg and Lund Hansen and Karpantschof on Copenhagen in this volume). But as such strategies tend to upgrade and valorize the spaces made attractive by artists, squatters and alternative or (sub-)cultural interim users, they lead to further displacing or marginalizing groups that lack symbolic cultural resources, thus triggering the protest of these outcast groups. (cf. Mayer, 2016)

2. Secondly, neoliberalization has led cities to adopt entrepreneurial forms of governance in ever-more policy areas, where they make more and more use of presumably more efficient business models and privatized forms of governance. This has involved a proliferation of outcontracting and a shift towards task- and project-driven initiatives, such as developing a particular part of town (e.g., new upscale uses for waterfronts, ‘science cities’, etc.), or competing for mega-events such as the Olympics, World Cups, International Building Exhibits, or Garden Shows—though municipal treasurers have become increasingly wary of failed projects and speculative ruin, and increasingly favour smaller-scale regeneration efforts instead. In any case, with these supposedly more efficient entrepreneurial modes of governance, mayors and their partners from the business sector, often bypassing council chambers, have set up special agencies to deliver target-driven initiatives that focus on specific, concrete objectives. In contrast to previous Keynesian modes of governance, which secured the consent of the governed through tripartite, corporate and long-term designs,
these novel modes of regulation, while less transparent and often not democratically legitimized do produce hegemony, but they do so via the small-scale involvement of different segments off society: We now see flexible, small and constantly changing concessions to shifting particular groups, primarily middle class-based and upwardly mobile ones. In this ad-hoc and informalized political process, global developers and international investors have come to play even more leading roles—though it is local politics that allows them this role. These entrepreneurial strategies and their lack of public transparency have given rise to all kinds of struggles over (the erosion of) representative democracy. They have been behind the ‘real democracy’ demands of Madrid’s Indignados and the resistance against the plans for Gezi Park (see Martinez and Lelandais in this volume), as well as countless urban campaigns against the undemocratic ways in which large urban infrastructure projects get pushed through (cf., for example, Dragojlo, 2015; Peters & Novy, 2012; Watt, 2013). Besides those citizens protesting against non-transparent decision-making that expedites projects favoured by global developers or corporations, those who do not conform to the standards of international investors now shaping the urban environment have also taken to protest against being excluded from their ‘right to the city’ (cf. Birke in this volume; Brenner, Marcuse and Mayer, 2012).

3. Intensified privatization of public infrastructures and services is another key feature of neoliberal urbanism, which keeps being pushed to new levels. This has not only transformed the traditional relation between the public and the private, as it involves not just the rolling-back and reorganization of the socially oriented institutions of the public sector, but, as everything from public transport and utilities to social housing is now exposed to the market, privatization has actually turned into financialization (cf. Hodkinson, 2012; Rolnik, 2013). In this raiding of public coffers, often by government-sponsored private companies, urban resources and public infrastructure and services are turned into options for expanded capital accumulation by dispossession (cf. Merrifield, 2013). Where the public sector has not yet been fully privatized, where, for example, health care, child care, schools or universities are still in the public sector, tight city budgets have been
used as justification for keeping public employees’ wages stagnant. Municipalities and provincial governments have frozen or cut back expenditures and wages, which has triggered unexpectedly strong waves of strikes in Germany, and led to the formation of the *tides* movements in Spain (Streeck, 2015; Martinez in this volume). Intensification of privatization has equally pertained to land: The extortion of maximal land rent works best through dedicating more and more private spaces to elite consumption, while the privatization of other (public) areas, such as shopping malls or train stations, has meant limiting access to and/or making the use of collective infrastructures more expensive. Whole urban centres from Paris, Manhattan and London to Singapore and Hong Kong are becoming, in the words of the *Financial Times*, no less, ‘exclusive citadels of the elites.’ ‘[T]he middle classes and small companies are falling victim to class-cleansing. Global cities are becoming patrician ghettos’ (Kuper, 2013). These enclosure strategies have triggered a variety of contestations, from protests against rent increases and cutbacks of public infrastructures, services, schools and universities, to occupations of social centres (see, for example, the tenants and squatters movements in Poland, described by Polanska, and the struggles over social centres such as Hamburg’s Rota Flora, described by Birke, or Copenhagen’s Youth House, detailed by Lund and Karpantschof, in this volume). Social cutbacks also underlie the uprisings that have erupted in deprived city areas, whether the suburbs of Paris and Stockholm, or inner-city neighbourhoods in London and other British cities, as described in the respective chapters in this volume. Furthermore, situationist-inspired guerrilla and other actions in the semi-public, privatized spaces of surveillance and consumption have responded to privatization processes impinging on public spaces (cf. Belina, 2010; Eick & Briken, 2014). Intensification of privatization is also behind the urban restructuring that triggered the massive uprisings in Spanish cities, as well as the Gezi Park contestation analyzed in this volume. Finally, movements have forced municipalities to re-communalize water and/or energy utilities with popular referenda, but this has occurred only sporadically (cf. Becker, Beveridge, & Naumann, 2015). Where deprivation and exclusion that have deepened through these enclosure strategies are coupled with punitive state
measures and police brutality, which manifest as part of a further, fourth characteristic feature of neoliberal urbanism, combustible situations are generated.

4. The earlier neoliberal tool kit for dealing with *social polarization* has been replaced. During the roll-out phase of neoliberalism, this tool kit consisted of area-based programs, i.e., some mix of neighbourhood, revitalization and activation programs that were to stop the presumed downward spiral of ‘blighted’ or so-called ‘problem’ neighbourhoods (‘neoliberalism with a human face’). These programs have meanwhile been severely curtailed and superseded by a two-pronged policy. These prongs consist, on the one hand, of attrition and displacement policies, and, on the other, of more benign programs designed to incorporate select impoverished groups and areas into upgrading efforts. For example, decaying social housing districts or (ex-)industrial areas that are deemed to have some development potential increasingly become locations for urban spectacles and development projects, and city managers claim that these strategies will upgrade existing populations. While not displacing poor residents with immediate force, such programs still tend to work as vehicles not only to upgrade and revitalize such neighbourhoods, but also to induce a gradual residential shift. This, too, often creates controversial effects that may trigger resistance.

But the prong that in many cities has lately been gaining more strength and significance, and seems to be outpacing the more ‘benign’ one, consists of punitive, repressive and criminalizing measures and instruments. It entails attrition and displacement policies that are pushing the poor to further outskirts or into invisible interstices of blight within the urban perimeter, as well as punitive strategies that tend to criminalize unwanted behaviours and groups. The intricate causal relationship between these processes—the gentrification-led restructuring of city centres and inner-city housing markets through new and often gated development projects, the clearance of public housing, the elimination of tenant protections and the exacerbated exclusion of disadvantaged places, milieus and social groups—is everywhere obfuscated in new discourses of (in-)securitization and self-responsibilization (cf. Slater, 2011; Smith, 2002). Underlying the
expansion of these vulnerable groups and of their grievances are macro processes such as the deregulation and flexibilization of labour markets, welfare retrenchment and the increase of low-wage and informal sectors that employ growing sections of the (racialized) ‘precariat’ and growing numbers of migrants, i.e., growing and differentiating sets of precarious, often paperless, workers (cf. Mayer, 2010; McNevin, 2006; Wacquant, 2009).

Many communities of colour, informal workers, homeless people, the undocumented and, increasingly, victims of the new austerity, as well as protest movements and urban ‘rioters’, confront this repressive side of neoliberal politics: increasingly strict laws, tougher policing and more disenfranchisement. As precious central-urban space plays such a key role in interurban competition, urban policy-makers seek to cleanse it of whatever might diminish its exchange value or disrupt the exclusive commerce and consumption or tourism that is supposed to take place here (cf. Beckett & Herbert, 2010; Eick & Briken, 2014, esp. Section III: Policing the Urban Battleground).

Thus, both traditionally vulnerable groups, the ones Wacquant (2008) labelled ‘urban outcasts’, as well as new-austerity victims, are increasingly losing out, whether in labour or housing markets. They confront more extensive surveillance, more aggressive policing and generally more stigmatizing, repressive and expelling treatment. Feher (2015) describes increasingly brutal ways of ‘disposing of the discredited’ that have become characteristic of neoliberal governance. These measures to ‘disappear’ people without assets, who are of no use to austere neoliberalism, range from making them statistically invisible, via harassing them ‘to death’, all the way to pushing them out of or not letting them into gated Europe.

In some ways, ailing municipalities and cities teetering on the brink of bankruptcy are at the forefront of systemic austerity, as they engage in the most drastic cutbacks in public infrastructure. Not just in debt-ridden Southern Europe, but also in presumably still-stable Germany, the number of heavily indebted cities has exploded, and some municipalities have gone broke (AKP, 2011; Holtkamp & Kuhlmann, 2012; Müllender, 2013). Municipal fiscal crises are used to install (unelected) so-called ‘emergency managers’, who can rule with unrestricted author-
ity over the urban region for which fiscal emergency has been declared. These state-imposed managers pass laws and decrees that suspend essential political and social rights (Peck, 2013; Schipper & Schöning, 2016).

Rather than receiving support from supra-local levels of government, ailing cities are requested to shoulder even more burdens, responsibilities and deficits, which higher levels of government are shifting downward. Given shrinking room to manoeuvre, most of these cities attempt to tackle the offloaded social and ecological ‘externalities’ with the very same methods of marketization, outsourcing, deregulation and privatization of public services and social supports which have already proven to incapacitate the state, thereby burdening those at the bottom and compounding their economic marginalization by means of state abandonment (Peck, 2012, pp. 650–651).

All of these currently popular instruments and policies have implications for the ways in which urban resistance forms, and they structure oppositional groups’ ability to manoeuvre. While creative city policies may open up new space and resources for action, and sustain some initiatives, expanded austerity and criminalization policies not only exacerbate social polarization, but also restrict and suffocate (protest) movements of more vulnerable urban residents. The expansion of stop-and-frisk measures, identity controls and surveillance technologies has particularly affected migrant groups, especially youth. But this disciplinary, repressive side is also looming larger in authorities’ response to radical, militant and riotous behaviour (cf. Slater, Dikeç, Sernhede et al., as well as Birke, Martinez, and Lelandais in this volume).

In sum, neoliberal urbanism—the ground and target within and against which a broad spectrum of urban collective actions, from well-organized campaigns and social movement actions to violent eruptions, have co-evolved—is complexly configured. While it manifests in different nationally and locally specific forms, it contrasts markedly with previous urban constellations, and thus exerts rather different influences and constraints on contemporary contestations. The next section explores the dynamics and mutual influences of neoliberal urbanism and resistance to it.
Neoliberal Urbanism and Resistance

As indicated, the delineated manifestations of neoliberal urbanism have had implications for collective action: some triggering protest directly, others affecting resistance through the way they shape political opportunity structures. Anti-austerity protests have flared up both on the left and the right, and new middle class-based activism has also emerged to attempt to maintain accustomed ways of life (e.g., Poulios, 2014). Advocacy and solidarity movements for and by austerity victims have expanded—from soup kitchens to anti-eviction networks and campaigns to defend the rights of the homeless or the rights of refugees—and many other urban movements, even if not directed against austerity, have been affected or transformed by the changing urban context. For example, countercultural and anarchist movements that used to, and in some ways still, benefit from creative city policies are themselves increasingly precarized (Mayer, 2016; see also Birke, Polanska, Martinez and the chapter by Lund Hansen and Karpantschof in this volume).

This section cannot provide a systematic analysis of the complex and contradictory forms of urban resistance that have arisen in this latest round of neoliberalization, which would also need to include regressive, right-wing, and not only progressive, emancipatory, variants of resistance against neoliberal urbanism. As the chapter’s purpose is to shed light on the relations between the dynamics of urban neoliberalization and the urban uprisings of recent decades motivated by social justice, rather than by ideals of blood or national purity or by religious fundamentalism, it focuses on those types of urban resistance and moments of uprising that are or can become part of progressive social movements seeking to dismantle and replace neoliberal-rule regimes in order to realize justice and equality for all urban residents.7

This section highlights three correspondences between neoliberal urbanism and its resistance: First, it shows how the dynamics and tensions inherent to neoliberal urbanism have generated greater conflict and

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7 It would require a different analysis to account for the significance of right-wing, populist and xenophobic movements, which have also expanded in the context of, and are sometimes directed against, neoliberal austerity.
contestation involving a more heterogeneous group of affected subjects; second, it illustrates just how variegated collective actions in response to urban upgrading policies can be; and third, it explores how, in the context of the massive upheaval that has swept across Greece and Spain, Oxford University Press grassroots efforts to rebuild another city from below have evolved.

**A Larger and More Heterogeneous Field of Urban Activism**

The increasingly austere form of neoliberal urbanism sketched above has redefined the ground for progressive urban collective action, particularly for existing urban movements. For one thing, existing movements confront additional targets and adversaries beyond city politicians, such as

![Fig. 2.1 Wem gehört die strasse. (Who does the street belong to?) Photo: Bruce Spear](image)
unelected technocrats, especially financial technocrats, as well as global investors and developers, who are behind the financialization of housing markets and push for big development projects. For another, movements now mobilize around a panoply of new issues, such as privatizations and cuts to education, child care, social services and pension), evictions, rising poverty and homelessness, and racist anti-refugee populism and media campaigns against ‘others’ who are painted as ‘living beyond their means’. In addition, they face more and new forms of repression, and witness de-democratization in many spheres, as well as suspension of civil rights, which increasingly affects their own practices.\(^8\) Many suffer from shrinking resources, opportunities and open spaces for their activities, for example, as they lose state funding or legal status as recognized associations, or lose public support by being criminalized. The movement terrain has been further altered as it has been expanded by new actors entering the stage, mobilizing around such restrictive measures and drawing public attention to the deprivation of rights and resources imposed on unwanted or ‘disposable’ groups. Human rights groups, solidarity initiatives and scores of more or less spontaneous actions have drawn on populations that used to be uninvolved in urban activism.

As recent austerity cuts have hit not only the traditionally disadvantaged, but, increasingly, youth, students, creatives and other, middle class segments, more and more people experience the punitive side of neoliberal urbanism. And this is not only the case for Southern European cities, but, as the chapters on Paris, London, Copenhagen and Stockholm in this book reveal, also for cities in Northern Europe. Primarily, though, it is vulnerable and marginalized social groups that are confronted with this side of the neoliberalizing city.

Wherever those who are denied their right to the city fight back and confront the political system with their demands, they face—if not merely deaf ears—more restrictions, surveillance and more aggressive policing than their (potential) allies in the alternative and countercul-

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\(^8\) Cf. the new draconian Spanish safety law, which was passed in June 2015 in direct response to some of the anti-austerity protests sweeping across Spanish cities. Now, demonstrators participating in unauthorized protest near ‘sensitive’ locations can face fines of as much as €600,000 (Minder, 2015; Streck, 2015).
tural scenes, who possess assets that are potentially marketable in the context of interurban rivalry over cultural branding. While the latter may receive concessions and offers for incorporation, ‘urban outcasts’ usually experience stigmatizing and repressive treatment which exacerbates their disenfranchisement and deepens the divides and oppositions among the different groups locked out of or exploited by the neoliberal city and dispossessed through its crisis management.

Local authorities frequently exacerbate the distance and alienation between, on the one hand, groups that possess certain leverage within the neoliberal city, and those that are stigmatized and ‘othered’. But even before any differential forms of state repression produce or intensify these distances, very real differences in terms of cultural and everyday experience between comparatively privileged movement groups and ‘outcasts’ already exist. And, also, within the various groups that make up the latter, different positions and thus different interests exist. For example, the homeless, the undocumented, the welfare-dependent, workers in informal economies and migrant youth have extremely divergent experiences and face widely different challenges. These different positions and interests often make it difficult to join together in a common struggle, as the cases of Paris or London indicate. The existence of these very real hurdles in the increasingly heterogeneous field of urban activism makes the conjoining of forces, when it does occur, the more remarkable. The assemblies held on Greek and Spanish plazas that brought forth joint actions of evicted homeowners and M15 activists, or Gezi Park’s defenders bringing established urban social movements, environmentalists and government critics together in a powerful battle against the Turkish politics neoliberalizing the city, and also alliances between working-class immigrant youth and middle-class inner-city activists, such as were formed in Swedish suburbs, illustrate ways in which, despite cultural and social differences, new and old movements have managed to struggle jointly. For this reason, these, as well as many smaller struggles, that managed to bridge stark positional distances in building joint movements against neoliberal urban policies deserve particular attention.
Variegated Forms of Resistance Against Urban Upgrading

As David Harvey (2006, p. 28) has observed for the movement landscape in the neoliberal age in general, social activists have increasingly shifted to ‘rights discourses’. In cities from Brazil to Turkey and Germany, the slogans of urban movements have adapted this general shift to social justice discourses by invoking the ‘Right to the City’. While all Right to the City (RttC) initiatives and networks refer back to Henri Lefebvre’s original definition that ‘the right to the city (is) like a cry and a demand’ (1967, p. 158), movements under this banner in fact comprise a huge variety of practices and goals. On one end of the spectrum, groups and organizations are working to get charters passed that seek to protect specific rights (plural) in order to secure participation for all in the city (as it exists). On the other end of the spectrum, more radical movements seek to create the right to a (more open, genuinely democratic) city through social and political agency (cf. Birke, 2010 in this volume).

As highlighted in the chapters on Hamburg and Istanbul in this volume, it has been primarily in Germany and Turkey where protest networks and alliances have coalesced under the banner of the ‘Right to the City’. But also, those not explicitly invoking this motto have recently brought together a greater number of different groups than the earlier waves of urban movements in the 1970s and 1980s (cf. Mayer, 2013).

Typically, these contemporary networks of urban activism in Europe, from Greece and Spain in the south, to France, Germany and Scandinavia in the north, and all the way to Turkey and the post-socialist countries in the east, consist of some combination of the following social groupings:

- radical autonomous, anarchist and alternative groups and various leftist organizations;

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9 This strand of RttC activism has rather depoliticizing effects, as explained in Mayer (2012).
10 Cities in Poland, Croatia and some other CEE regions have also seen Right to the City alliances gain broad support and even enter municipal councils and governments (Poblocki, 2012; Saric, 2012).
middle-class urbanites who seek to defend their accustomed quality of life;
residents in poor urban areas, often with heterogeneous histories of migration;
other disparate groups that share a precarious existence, whether in the informal sector, in the creative industries or among college students;
artists and other creative professionals, many of whom are also precarized; and
frequently, local environmental groups that fight harmful energy, climate or development policies.

While recent uprisings against neoliberal urbanism in Southern European cities have generally been inclusive of marginalized and ‘disposable’ groups within Northern European activist networks, including Right to the City networks, the marginalized, people of colour and groups deemed ‘disposable’ have rarely played major active roles so far, a fact which many political activists regard as a strategic problem, and a reason why alliances involving immigrant youth that have emerged in Swedish suburbs are so interesting (see chapter by Sernhede et al. in this volume).

Thus, the differences within two-speed Europe, between ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ European countries, need to be explored, and appear to underlie the contrast between broad popular alliances (as manifested in the Indignados and Aganaktismenoi) and comparatively narrower protest against neoliberal urbanism in the ‘core’. However, we also need to explore the conditions that have allowed new urban movements to evolve in Northern European cities, which unite the marginalized working class, frequently with migrant backgrounds, with more or less precarized middle-class groups, and have also brought forth new urban political actors articulating a clear rejection of the ways in which austerity urbanism has harmed their neighbourhoods and living conditions. The rest of this section thus focuses on some cases that represent and illustrate the dynamic between neoliberal urban restructuring, on the one hand, and different types of mobilization and alliances, on the other.

One of the most best-known RttC networks is Hamburg’s, which emerged in 2009, based on the dense history of social protests described by Birke in this volume. It joined together a variety of local groups active
against the city’s housing policies and location marketing. The network enjoyed enormous visibility through its large parades composed of ‘squatters, tenants, artists’, and because it managed to seize on the crisis-induced bankruptcy of an investor who had bought up the historic Gängeviertel. While the Hamburg case well illustrates the powerful leverage that (cultural) activists can exert in the context of an urban politics that seeks to compete on the basis of branding a city as a cultural-creative capital, it also reveals the relative exclusivity of the network, in spite of its heterogeneity.

When some RttC activists attempted to broaden the scope of the network by tackling another feature of Hamburg’s neoliberal urbanism, namely strategies to upgrade deindustrialized districts south of the River Elbe in Wilhelmsburg, they foregrounded the rights of local residents, such as low-income tenants and immigrants, in downgraded housing. As described above, such formerly stigmatized neighbourhoods are increasingly targeted for upscale valorization processes. Because local residents usually have a strong interest in stopping the downward spiral their neighbourhoods are caught in, they tend to put up little resistance to such upscaling strategies. Typically, the housing stock has been neglected for decades, and the socioeconomic situation is characterized by job losses due to deindustrialization, shipyard closures and lack of investment in public and social infrastructures. As the city went about upgrading parts of this area, using urban-development corporations to implement a garden show and an international building exhibit, and pioneers and gentrifiers began to enter simultaneously, an activist group operating within Hamburg’s RttC network set out to politicize the conflicts triggered by these upgrading processes and to support low-income social-housing residents. Activist-researchers Birke, Hohenstatt, and Rinn (2015) describe how difficult it has been to generate broad mobilization, highlighting ‘the hierarchies of visibility and spaces of articulation available’ to different groups in the city (Birke et al., 2015, p. 216, 217).

Similar to Hamburg’s growth pressures, which made city politicians choose the impoverished area of Wilhelmsburg for upgrading, Stockholm’s growth pressures have affected the suburb of Husby. Since Husby is located next to Sweden’s Silicon Valley, ‘Kista Science City’, Stockholm politicians wanted Kista to expand across Husby. They planned for demolitions of large housing complexes, for out-contracting
and privatizing public infrastructure such as public health and care services, for housing renovations implying huge rent increases, and to shut down the social centre, Husby Träff. But the immigrant-dominated suburb has a history of strong social struggles, and local movement organizations such as Megaphone, founded in 2008, protested the ‘renovictions’ and succeeded in preventing some of these policies from being implemented. They also occupied the centre against closure.

As in many other Swedish peripheral poor neighbourhoods, populated by many different ethnicities, tensions have risen not only because more than half a million poorly maintained apartments risk being upgraded with rent increases of up to 65%, but also due to intensified policing practices: Police have implemented a zero-tolerance strategy in the suburbs as well as programs against political ‘radicalization’, thereby increasing resentment. The resistance put up by residents on the outskirts of cities such as Gothenburg, Malmö and Stockholm has thus been directed not merely against the deterioration of their neighbourhoods and the threat of gentrification, but also always against racism and harassment by police (see Sernhede et al. in this volume).

Unlike the cases of Paris in 2005 and London in 2011, deeply rooted social movement organizations had been in place when the ‘riots’ broke out in the impoverished suburbs of Stockholm in 2013. Thus, this case illustrates how violent uprisings and social movement organizations may be intricately connected. In spite of some successes of these new popular-justice movements, particularly with regard to the public framing of car burnings—which in Sweden turned more to social explanations and corresponding reforms, where in Britain harsher punishments and more police were the widely shared response—polarization between central cities and suburban peripheries continues to widen, with the latter persistently impacted by structural racism, institutional discrimination and territorial stigmatization (cf. Schierup, Ålund, & Kings, 2014).

Another novel alliance is epitomized by urban movements in CEE countries, which also developed in response to neoliberalization policies.11

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11Both anti-capitalist and conservative groups are concerned with the protection of public space and national heritage against what they perceive as exploitative neoliberal interests. Jacobsson (2015, p. 281) shows that this oscillation between progressive and regressive claims among urban movements reflects the ambivalence that characterizes the ‘post-socialist condition’. 
In Poland, where tenant and squatting movements had initially developed in opposition to each other, the tenant movement shifted to resist neoliberalization as accession to the EU made the detrimental effects of privatization in the housing sector more manifest. Simultaneously, anarchist squatters shifted their emphasis from anti-statism to anti-capitalism, opening the way to cooperation between both movements, as the intensifying neoliberalization of urban development sharpened resistance in both camps, as is traced in Polanska’s chapter. This alliance is interesting, as it allows us to see the essentializing move so characteristic of much social movement research that pitches institutionalized against non-institutionalized action. The Polish case demonstrates that the difference between such forms of action becomes minimal in a context where—as is the case in the CEE region—movement organisations have a short history and limited resources, and where formal structures are often embedded in a high level of informality (Jacobsson, 2015, p. 277).

**Rebuilding the City from the Grassroots—In the Context of Massive Societal Upheaval**

The Greek and Spanish public-square movements have brought together broadly heterogeneous resistance against austerity on a far more massive scale than any of the Northern European movements. The harsh austerity programs imposed by the EU crisis regime affected societies suddenly and drastically, which has translated into higher rates of participation in strikes and demonstrations, square protests and neighbourhood assemblies. The Southern European countries provide rich illustrations of how new as well as pre-existing urban social movements have seized on growing anti-austerity sentiments, and managed to broaden their bases and create new alliances, as well as new action forms and practices.

In Greece, where the most severe austerity measures have been implemented, unemployment rose from 7.8%, in 2008 to 28% in November 2013, and the poverty level reached 40%, the scale of protest mobilizations and revolts has been unprecedented. Starting with the revolt of December 2008 (Leontidou, 2010; Sotiris, 2010; Vradis & Dalakoglou, 2011), Greece has seen hundreds of massive demonstrations, occupa-
tions, widespread mobilizations and more than 25 general strikes. In May 2010, when the Greek government entered into the first loan agreement with the *troika* of the EU, ECB and IMF, an unprecedented move for an EU member state, huge demonstrations flooded Thessaloniki and Athens, and a national strike on 5 May protested the bail-out terms, spending cuts and tax increases.\(^{12}\) When the Greek parliament approved the Second Memorandum and the reduction of the minimum wage on 12 February 2012, 500,000 protesters again surrounded parliament and ‘riots’ broke out across the city, with at least 100,000 people battling the police for hours late into the night. This was not the only instance when militant, ‘non-peaceful’ forms of action occurred embedded in broad-based social movements.

After the 2012–2014 period of depression, many movements made a strategic choice to reinforce their neighbourhood-oriented, day-to-day work of mutual support and solidarity. They work in food kitchens, farmers markets, free markets for exchanging clothing and other essentials, solidarity clinics, alternative schools, schooling for immigrants, and legal support to help people at risk of losing their homes, electricity and water—not only to organize much-needed help and satisfy collective needs, but also to build self-managed spaces for public resistance against neoliberal politics and relations for changing the balance of forces against the existing exploitative structures (Henley, 2015).

While disillusionment with electoral politics after Syriza’s policy U-turn in June 2015 has been widespread (the abstention rate in the September 2015 election was 45\%),\(^ {13}\) solidarity infrastructures have continued to grow. For example, there are now over 50 solidarity clinics in Greece, and 15 in Athens alone.\(^ {14}\) Besides providing much-needed medical services, these self-organized clinics continue to pressure the government to provide better medical and health care for all, including the

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\(^{12}\) Almost a third of the adult Greek population took part in the 2010 anti-austerity protests (Rüdig & Karyotis, 2013).

\(^{13}\) Both this record-high abstention rate and the extraordinary number of blank ballots (2.5\%) reveal the enormous disappointment with and rejection of party politics among broad layers of the Greek population questioning neoliberal policies.

\(^{14}\) Most are full-service clinics, and all are run entirely by volunteers, from doctors and nurses to pharmacists and technical support. Each treats anywhere from a few thousand to over 12,000 people a year.
undocumented. Besides fighting against privatization of the health sector, they are also engaged in action against racism and xenophobia, and in various refugee-support activities, as well as in campaigns for Kobane and Palestine. While locally organized in assembly structures, they are also networked with similar organizations nationally and across Europe.

Because Spain’s extreme housing and foreclosure crisis created an enormous pool of Afectados, and because many of the movements making up the Indignados shared a particularly autonomous, party-sceptical stance, urban movements in Spain have faced even more conducive conditions for building sustainable structures of solidarity in urban neighbourhoods. When the housing bubble burst, beginning in 2007, Spain’s foreclosure rates were exploding, along with unemployment rates, and the number of evictions of people unable to pay their mortgages began to skyrocket. In response, the Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca (PAH) was created in 2009 in Madrid. In 2011, PAH joined the coalition Democracia Real Ya! in its call for a 15 May demonstration (see Martínez in this volume). The squares movement that unfolded in its wake made visible how many people stood behind the 15 M movement’s demand for a more participatory democracy no longer controlled by the two-party PSOE-PP system. In order to defend the openness of the situation, 15 M activists explicitly distanced themselves from all political parties as well as unions of the left, thus redefining the meaning of political action. Though leftist organizations were excluded, the 15 M developed not merely a sharp critique of the established political system, but also of the neoliberal regime, austerity politics and the power of corporations, thus going beyond the liberal conception of democracy. And, through the prefigurative practices developed in the collective organization of everyday life on the squares and plazas, as well as the countless direct actions planned and carried out from the encampments, such as occupying party offices, blockading the parliament, protests at detention centres, and rebuilding cleared

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15 The minister of health has now prepared legislation to permit access to health care for the uninsured, to be voted on in parliament in December 2015. In case the troika prevents passage, solidarity clinics are planning nationwide actions.

16 Spanish unemployment was 27% at the peak of the economic crisis in early 2013. It has since come down to 23.8% of the active population in July 2015, but the rate for the under-25-year-olds continues to be around 50%.
squares, which were frequently met with violent police action, the movement gained cohesiveness and legitimacy. Within weeks of the 15 May demonstrations, the movement had become a new political subject, and polls noted that 80% of the population shared its political goals: radical democratization, an end to the politics of austerity, saving people before banks (Zelik, 2015, p. 102).

By late summer 2011, the assemblies of the 15 M decided to move their activities to the neighbourhoods, which, however, did not mean an end of the uprisings. Since then, the 15 M protests have begun to mingle more and more with struggles carried out by unions, social coalitions, and groups of the political left, against cuts in health and education, labour-market reforms and police brutality. Other new groupssuch as the tides have emerged in different sectors.

In spite of the huge, sustained support 15 M has mobilized throughout Spanish society, the movement’s capacity to influence national policies has remained limited. However, it did provide some opportunities to new parties and electoral platforms at the municipal level.

As a way to carry ‘the spirit of the 15 M’ into institutions, local electoral platforms were founded: In 2014, a group forming around PAH spokesperson Ada Colau presented Guanyem (Catalan for ‘Let’s win’), a grassroots initiative to develop a joint municipal program for Barcelona. The municipal elections in May 2015 brought a landslide, not only in Barcelona, where BarcelonaEnComú (the new name of Guanyem) won 25.2%, but also in Madrid, where Ahora Madrid won 31.9%), and in Valencia, A Coruna, Santiago, Ferrol, Zaragoza, and Cádiz, where alternative electoral platforms saw significant victories, gaining mayoralities and city council seats.

17PAH called for demonstrations against evictions in 41 cities in late September, and in mid-October, after the Occupy movement has taken off in the USA, a global day of action of the ‘outraged’ took place, including demonstrations in more than 900 cities in 80 countries.

18Marea Blanca, the white tide, emerged at the end of 2012 against cutbacks in public health, as well as the green tide in education.

19The three female mayors elected in Barcelona, Madrid and Valencia immediately took similar measures in child welfare, housing and poverty alleviation, and also began to put movement-network strategies of solidarity and cooperation into practice (Flesher Fominaya, 2015; Zelik, 2015).
The success of these municipal lists clearly rests on the broad mobilizations that people engaged in when they sensed that they can co-determine the politics to be implemented within their city. At the same time, these local successes risk falling into the ‘local trap’ if they do not manage to link via horizontal networks and scale up to higher governmental levels.

**Overcoming Neoliberal Urbanism**

The specific challenge, then, thrown up by neoliberal urbanism to its contestants has two sides: On the one side, it has created unique opportunities for broad-based and cross-class mobilizations, especially, but not only, in Southern European cities. On the other, the distances and rifts between the heterogeneously affected and mobilized groups are very...
real and not automatically overcome by fighting the same adversary. In fact, they often impede the coming-together of distinct groups in joint struggles, and their local particularities often make a scaling-up of struggles difficult. This final section therefore returns to what the conceptual frameworks invoked in the beginning of this chapter entail in terms of their implications for the weakening, dismantling or overcoming of neoliberal urbanism.

With regard to opposition against neoliberalism, Harvey distinguishes between *immanent opposition* and *class movements*. The former, which tends to accept many of the basic propositions of neoliberalism, is far more widespread than the latter. Such oppositional movements mostly articulate contradictions immanent to neoliberalism by taking the promises of individual rights and freedoms seriously and opposing them to the authoritarianism of political, economic and class power. Human-rights movements and other individual-rights activism that have grown exponentially since the 1980s are seen as manifestations of this immanent opposition. Rights and justice discourses have accompanied and expanded with each wave of neoliberalization. Harvey sees them caught in the neoliberal trap, because a focus on these rights does not (re)create substantive and open democratic-governance structures (Harvey, 2006, pp. 50–51). In contrast to those, he identifies two types of observable class movements: (1) movements that mobilize around expanded reproduction, in which the exploitation of wage labour and conditions defining the social wage are still central issues; and (2) movements around accumulation by dispossession, in which everything from classic forms of primitive accumulation to the depredations wrought by contemporary forms of finance capital are the focus of resistance. Harvey sees it as an urgent practical and theoretical task to find the organic link between both of these forms of class movements (65) and suggests some ways in which this might occur in his book *Rebel Cities* (2012).

However, today’s extraordinarily heterogeneous spectrum of urban collective actors calls into question the clear-cut distinction Harvey has drawn between immanent opposition and class movements against neoliberalization, as even campaigns seizing on the rights and freedoms promised by neoliberal elites often evolve into and ally with movements for substantive change around issues of the social wage and accumulation by dispossession.
(Harvey, 2006, pp. 50–51). While we can identify analytic distinctions between different types of struggle and differently positioned actors, ‘real existing’ boundaries between them become increasingly porous, as organic links are emerging between well-structured social movement organizations, articulating clear demands, and spontaneous eruptions of marginalized and othered (sub)urban residents; between, on the one hand, middle class-based but increasingly precarious cultural workers and political activists and, on the other, downgraded workers made redundant by deindustrialization and waves of neoliberalization, who find themselves relegated to disadvantaged peripheral neighbourhoods, and so forth. The fact that such links emerge on the basis of the shared experience of being dispossessed and disenfranchised by accelerated urban neoliberalization and the political responses to its crises,²⁰ does not mean, however, that very real distances, tensions and conflicts, even between those who participate in urban collective action, don’t continue to exist or need to be addressed.

Aside from the massive mobilizations that erupted across Greece and Spain, bringing many first-time demonstrators to the occupied squares and assemblies, and where, after the dismantling of the protest camps, popular assemblies were set up throughout urban neighbourhoods involving thousands of people who had never before been part of urban-resistance movements, such cross-class involvement of different milieus and demographics in joint actions have been rare. While in Greece and Spain the marginalized and racialized participated in urban-resistance movements from early on (see the chapters by Vradis and Martinez), comparably marginalized groups in Northern European cities are either at risk of falling for nationalist ideologies, or may form the core of violent uprisings such as took place in Paris and London in response to increasing social inequalities, racialized territorial stigmatization and the absence of democracy in urban-restructuring processes (cf. chapters by Dikec and Slater). While the underlying causes everywhere have to do with

²⁰For example, the political responses to the foreclosure and banking crisis have been massive bank bailouts and central banks around the world making cheap credit available, with the ECB embarking on quantitative easing only in 2014. These cheap interest rates meant that enormous amounts of fresh liquidity flooded the global financial system, which, while subsidizing private investors out of bankruptcy, produced a tide of surplus capital, most of which has turned to speculative investment in stocks, bonds and, once again, real estate.
dismantled welfare services and the other features of neoliberal urbanism highlighted in section two of this chapter, the case studies presented in this volume’s following chapters show that conditions for the emergence of urban social movements and their claim-making depend very much on local circumstances.

These varied localized joint struggles will need, however, to multiply beyond the sum of their parts. This, in any case, is the implication of the conceptualization Brenner et al. (2010) have developed about the rise, as well as the overcoming, of neoliberalization. Setting up a ‘moving map of neoliberalization,’ the authors distinguish three dimensions of neoliberalization processes, corresponding roughly to the decades in which neoliberalization shifted from ‘disarticulated’ to ‘deep(ening)’: regulatory experiments (1970), mechanisms for inter-jurisdictional policy transfer (1980s), and finally trans-national rule regimes (1990s). Counter-neoliberal pathways and scenarios are conceived as following parallel dimensions of regulatory restructuring, progressively pushing back and replacing the neoliberal rule regimes, from experiments across dispersed, disarticulated contexts at local, regional and national scales, via a thickening of networks of policy transfer based upon alternatives to market rule, all the way to ‘deep socialization’: dismantling and replacing neoliberal-rule regimes by constructing alternative, market-restraining, socializing frameworks for macro-spatial regulatory organization, characterized by radical democratization of decision-making and allocation capacities at all spatial scales (Brenner et al., 2010, pp. 333–342).

Building on this analysis, Peck et al. (2012) conclude ‘[t]hat the construction of counter neoliberalizing systems of policy transfer, whether among social movements, cities, regions or states, represents a major step forward for progressive activists and policy makers. But in the absence of a plausible vision for an alternative global rule regime, such networks are likely to remain interstitial, mere irritants to the global machinery of neoliberalization, rather than transformative threats to its hegemonic influence’ (Peck et al., 2012, p. 285).

Thus, not until we build new forms of interurban politics, not until we join forces across two-speed Europe, will there be a chance to break with the pattern of neoliberal austerity. Breaking with this pattern will require that ‘networking across local alternatives become much more effectively
articulated with a strategic fight for new rules of the extra-local game’ (Peck, 2013, p. 24, italics by MM).

If this should be the pathway on which anti-austerity movements operate, their success would have to be measured not only by their local victories, but also by their contribution towards building those new rules of the supra-local game. This clearly would have to be a multi-scalar struggle, requiring us to simultaneously sort out how to turn local solidarity practices into counter-neoliberal struggles while building movement-to-movement solidarity across the uneven European landscape, and how to politicize anti-eviction and other emergency support while pushing the state, on all scales, to protect rather than punish society with austerity policies.

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